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Cost-benefit analysis is only applicable if the variances of both costs and benefits are 
finite. In the case of climate change, the variances of the net present marginal costs and 
benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction need to be finite. Finiteness is hard, if not 
impossible to prove. The opposite is easier to establish as one needs to shows that there is 
one, not impossible representation of the climate change with infinite variance. The paper 
shows that all relevant current variables of the FUND model have finite variances. 
However, there is a small chance that climate change reverses economic growth in some 
regions. In that case, the discount rate becomes negative and the net present marginal 
benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction becomes very large. So large, that its 
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1. Introduction 
Uncertainty abounds in climate change. Uncertainty also abounds in the literature about 
climate change. Some papers try to describe the uncertainties (Hammitt, 1995; Harvey, 
1996a,b; Pate-Cornell, 1996; Schimmelpfennig, 1996), others try to quantify it (Morgan 
and Keith, 1995, Nordhaus, 1994). A number of papers try to place uncertainties in a 
decision analytic framework (Kann and Weyant, 1999). A prominent decision analytic 
framework is cost-benefit analysis (CBA), or rather welfare-maximisation (see 
Maddison, 1995; Manne et al., 1995; Nordhaus, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994; Nordhaus and 
Yang, 1996; Peck and Teisberg, 1992, 1994; see Eismont and Welch, 1996; Kolstad, 
1994, 1996; Leimbach, 1996; Nordhaus and Popp, 1997; Peck and Teisberg, 1993, 1995; 
Ulph and Maddison, 1997; Welsch, 1995 for applications of CBA under uncertainty). 
The main challenger of CBA is the safe minimum standard (SMS) approach (but see 
Lempert et al., 1996, better known in climate change contexts as the safe corridor/landing 
approach (Alcamo and Kreileman, 1996a,b) or the tolerable windows approach 
(Dowlatabadi, 1999; Petschel-Held et al., 1999; Toth et al., 1997; Yohe, 1999). SMS are 
often combined with cost-effectiveness analysis (Manne and Richels, 1996, 1998; Peck 
and Teisberg, 1996), also under uncertainty (Manne and Richels, 1995; Yohe, 1997; 
Yohe and Wallace, 1996). 
 
The current author is squarely in the CBA camp (Tol, 1997, 1999a-e). The main 
advantage of CBA is that it is internally consistent, founded on axioms of rational 
behaviour. Although policy makers are not always rational, I think policy advisors should 
be, and should seek the greatest good for the greatest number. 
 
SMS are arbitrary. They are set by a small group of researchers and policy makers, only a 
minority of whom are democratically elected. SMS are not based on polling people￿s 
preferences, as CBA is. Yet, SMS are the dominant decision analytic paradigm in climate 
change policy making. 
 
SMS have counterparts in formal decision analysis, such as ￿minimax regret￿ and similar 
decision rules. Such rules are applicable in cases of large uncertainties and incomplete 
information. Indeed, the axioms underlying CBA fall apart if the uncertainties about 
either costs or benefits are infinite. 
 
This paper tests whether the uncertainties about climate change are infinite, and thus 
whether CBA is an appropriate approach to climatic change. 
 
This looks like an impossible task. It is rather easy to build a model that has crucial 
variables with infinite variances. It is also rather easy to build a model with only finite 
variances. As climate change is a thing of the future, it is currently impossible to 
invalidate either type of model. 
 
This paper follows a different route. I first review the conditions for finite uncertainties 
(Section 2). After that, the paper takes a more empirical turn. I use a model that is 
constructed to be very regular (cf. Section 3). I use a model that was constructed to have finite variances (cf. Section 4). But, it has not. The reason is technical and model-
dependent (cf. Section 5). This reason suggests a narrative (cf. Section 6), which I leave 
for the reader to judge whether it is credible or not (cf. Section 7). 
  
2. Analytical  representation 
Collard (1988) distinguishes between weak and strong catastrophes. The set of 
environmental problems is denoted by P. An environmental problem p∈ P is catastrophic 
(p∈ C) if its impacts become infinitely large at the extreme. That is, if we denote impact 
of problem p by Ip indexed on state of nature s 
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A catastrophe is strong (p∈ SC) if the expected value of its impact, EIp, is infinite 
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where f(s) denote the probability density function of s. For strong catastrophes, 
diminishing chances do not cancel growing impacts. 
 
A catastrophe is weak (p∈ WC) if the expected value of its impact, EIp, is finite 
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Of course, C = SC ∪  WC. 
 
Obviously, (3) implies 
(4)  lim ( ) ( ) 0 p s fsI s
→∞ =  
That is, a catastrophe is weak if the chance decreases faster than the impact increases. 
However, (4) does not imply (3).  
 
For cost-benefit analysis to be applicable, a catastrophe needs not be weak, but very weak 
(p∈ VWC). A catastrophe is very weak if the variance of its impact, EI, is finite 
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Obviously, WC ⊂  VWC. 
 
The impact of climate change is not instantaneous. Instead, we are interested in the net 
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or rather its expected value 
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− =   Arguably, larger impacts are more remote in time and have less chance than smaller 
impacts. Thus, catastrophes are discounted in two ways, in time and in probability. The 
function Ip has to increase rapidly in either t or s to offset both time and probability 
discounting. 
 
However, the discount rate δ is a function of impact I. The standard neo-classical 
formulation is 
(8)  tt g δ ρ η =+  
That is, the (time-dependent) discount rate δ is the pure rate of time preference ρ plus the 
growth rate of consumption gt times the marginal elasticity of utility η. Large impacts 
negatively affect growth, and if this effect is large enough, the discount rate becomes 
negative. 
 
If the discount rate becomes negative for a long time, the integral of equation (6) diverges 
and the net present value of the impact becomes infinite. If this happens with a positive 
chance, the integral of equation (7) diverges as well. In that case, the catastrophe is 
strong. Recall that for cost-benefit analysis to be applicable, the catastrophe needs to be 
very weak. 
 
3. The  model 
The Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) serves 
various purposes. It was primarily developed to analyse efficient emission reduction 
strategies for various groups of countries (Tol et al., 1995; Tol, 1997; Tol, 1999a,b). 
Following the political agenda, FUND is now regularly used for cost-effectiveness analysis 
as well (Tol, 1999b,c), including multiple greenhouse gases (Tol et al., 2000). Uncertainty 
(Tol, 1995, 1999d) and impacts (Tol, 1995, 1996, 1998a, 1999e) have also been important 
considerations. This paper returns to the question about the uncertainty of impacts, using 
version 2.0 of FUND. Version 2.0 is the same as versions 1.6 to 1.9, which were used in the 
above papers, except for its impacts module, which is completely different (see Tol, 
1999f,g). 
 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations, 
specified for nine major world-regions, namely OECD-America, OECD-Europe, OECD-
Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Middle East, Latin 
America, South and South-East Asia, Centrally Planned Asia, and Africa. 
 
The model runs from 1950 to 2200, in time steps of a year. The prime reason for extending 
the simulation period into the past is the necessity to initialise the climate change impact 
module. In FUND, some climate change impacts are assumed to depend on the impact of 
the year before, so as to reflect the process of adaptation to climate change. Without a proper 
initialisation, climate change impacts are thus misrepresented in the first decades. Scenarios 
for the period 1950-1990 are based on historical observation, viz. the IMAGE 100-year 
database (Battjes and Goldewijk, 1994). The period 1990-2100 is based on the FUND 
scenario, which lies somewhere in between the IS92a and IS92f scenarios (Leggett et al., 
1992). Note that the original IPCC scenarios had to be adjusted to fit FUND’s nine regions 
and yearly time-step. The period 2100-2200 is based on extrapolation of the population, economic and technological trends in 2050-2100, that is, a gradual shift to a steady state of 
population, economy and technology. The model and scenarios are so far extrapolated that 
the results for the period 2100-2200 are not to be relied upon. This period is only used to 
provide the forward-looking agents in FUND with a proper perspective. 
 
The exogenous scenarios concern economic growth, population growth, urban population, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements, decarbonisation of the energy use, nitrous 
oxide emissions, and methane emissions. 
 
Incomes and population are perturbed by the impact of climate change. Population falls with 
climate change deaths, resulting from changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and 
tropical cyclones. Heat and cold stress are assumed to affect only the elderly, non-
reproductive population; heat stress only affects urban population. Population also changes 
with climate-induced migration between the regions. Economic impacts of climate change 
are modelled as deadweight losses to disposable income. Scenarios are only slightly 
perturbed by climate change impacts, however, so that income and population are largely 
exogenous. 
 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of carbon dioxide emissions, the atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, 
and the impact of climate change on coastal zones, agriculture, extreme weather, natural 
ecosystems and malaria. 
 
Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted: 
where C denotes concentration, E emissions, t year, and pre pre-industrial. Table 1 
displays the parameters for both gases. Equation (1) is a simplified representation of the 
relevant atmospheric chemistry. Particularly, the atmospheric life-time is not constant, 
but depends on the concentrations and emissions of other chemical species. 
 
Table 1. Parameters of Equation (1). 
Gas   α
a   β
b   Pre-industrial  concentration 
Methane (CH4)  0.3597    1/8.6    790  ppb 
Nitrous oxide (N2O)   0.2079   1/120   285  ppb 
a The  parameter  α translates emissions (in million metric tonnes of CH4 or N2O) into concentrations (in 
parts per billion by volume). 
b The  parameter  β determines how fast concentrations return to their pre-industrial (and assumedly 
equilibrium) concentrations; 1/β is the atmospheric life-time (in years) of the gases. 
 
The carbon cycle is a five-box model: 
  E   +   Box   =   Box t i 1 - t i, i t i, α ρ 000471 . 0 ( 2 a )  
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where αi denotes the fraction of emissions E (in million metric tonnes of carbon) that is 
allocated to box i (0.13, 0.20, 0.32, 0.25 and 0.10, respectively) and ρthe decay-rate of the 
boxes (ρ = exp(-1/lifetime), with life-times infinity, 363, 74, 17 and 2 years, 
respectively). Thus, 13% of total emissions remains forever in the atmospheric, while 
10% is -- on average -- removed in two years. The model is due to Maier-Reimer and 
Hasselmann (1987), its parameters to Hammitt et al. (1992). It assumes, incorrectly, that 
the carbon cycle is independent of climate change. Carbon dioxide concentrations are 
measured in parts per million by volume. 
 
Radiative forcing for carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are based on Shine et al. 
(1990). The global mean temperature T is governed by a geometric build-up to its 
equilibrium (determined by radiative forcing RF), with a life-time of 50 years. In the base 
case, global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5° C for a doubling of carbon 
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Global mean sea level is also geometric, with its equilibrium determined by the 
temperature and a life-time of 50 years. These life-times result from a calibration to the 
best guess temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
The climate impact module is fully described in Tol (1999f,g). The impact module has 
two units of measurement: people and money. People can die prematurely and migrate. 
These effects, like all other impacts, are monetised. Damage can be due to either the rate 
of change or the level of change. Benchmark estimates can be found in Table 2; more 
underlying assumptions are given in the Appendix. 
Table 2. Estimated impacts of a 1￿C increase in the global mean temperature. Standard 
deviations are given in brackets. 
  Billion dollar  percent of GDP 
OECD-A 175  (107)  3.4  (2.1) 
OECD-E 203  (118)  3.7  (2.2) 
OECD-P 32  (35)  1.0  (1.1) 
CEE&fSU 57  (108)  2.0  (3.8) 
ME 4  (8)  1.1  (2.2) 
LA -1  (5)  -0.1  (0.6) 
S&SEA -14  (9) -1.7 (1.1) 
CPA 9  (22)  2.1  (5.0) 
AFR -17  (9)  -4.1  (2.2) 
Source: Tol  (1999f). 
 
Impacts of climate change on energy consumption, agriculture and cardiovascular and 
respiratory diseases explicitly recognise that there is a climate optimum. The climate 
optimum is determined by a mix of factors, including physiology and behaviour. Impacts 
are positive or negative depending on whether climate is moving to or away from that optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate is further away from the 
optimum climate. The optimum climate concerns the potential impacts. Actual impacts 
lag behind potential impacts, depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of not 
being fully adapted to the new climate are always negative. 
 
Other impacts of climate change, on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosystems, 
water resources, malaria, dengue fever and schistosomiasis, are modelled as simple 
power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, but do not change sign. 
 
Vulnerability changes with population growth, economic growth, and technological 
progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water resources 
(with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanisation) and ecosystems and 
health (with higher values from higher per capita incomes). Other systems are projected 
to become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological progress), 
agriculture (with economic growth) and vector-borne diseases (with improved health 
care). 
 
All parameters in FUND are uncertain, and to each of them a probability density function 
was assigned. Table 4 shows the assumptions, which are more based on my judgement 
than on anything else. 
 
Table 4. Assumptions in the Monte Carlo analysis. 
Parameter Distribution mean  standard  deviation
Scenarios   
Population growth  Normal scenario  grows over time
Economic growth  Normal scenario  grows over time
AEEI  Normal scenario  grows over time
ACEI  Normal scenario  grows over time
Urban population  Normal scenario  grows over time
Methane emissions  Normal scenario  grows over time
Nitrous oxide emissions  Normal scenario  grows over time
Climate change   
Life-time carbon dioxide  Normal 363; 74; 17; 2  182; 37; 9; 1
Life-time methane  Triangular 10.2  1.3
Life-time nitrous oxide  Triangular 130 15
Climate sensitivity  Gamma 2.85  1.00
Sea level sensitivity  Gamma 0.36  0.15
Climate response time  Triangular 58  16
Sea level response time  Triangular 58  16
Impacts   
Sensitivity to level of climate change  Normal see appendix  see appendix
Sensitivity to rate of climate change  Normal* see appendix  see appendix
Sensitivity to sea level  Normal* see appendix  see appendix
Non-linearity   
Agriculture Normal*
  2.0 0.5
Forestry Normal*
  1.0 0.5
Water Normal*
  1.0 0.5
Space heating  Normal* 1.0  0.5
Space cooling  Normal* 1.0  0.5
Vector-borne diseases  Normal* 1.0  0.5
Vector-borne diseases (income)  Normal* 1.0  0.5Adaptation time   
Agriculture Normal* 10  2.5
Immigration Normal* 3  1
Adaptation speed   
Dryland loss  Exponential 0.1  0.1
Wetland loss  Exponential 0.1  0.1
Emigration Exponential 0.1  0.1
Income elasticity   
Agriculture Normal* 0.31  0.15
Forestry Normal* 0.31  0.20
Water Normal* 0.85  0.15
Space heating  Normal* 0.80  0.20
Space cooling  Normal* 0.80  0.20
Population over 65  Normal* 0.25  0.08
Valuation   
Value of a statistical life  Normal* 200  100
Value of ecosystem change  Normal* 50  50
Standard income  Normal* 20,000  10,000
Miscellaneous   
Income threshold vector borne disease  Normal 3100  100 in 2000
plus 10 each year
Emigration costs  Normal* 3.0  1.5
Immigration costs  Normal* 0.4  0.2
Immigration intake  Stand. normal  
Cardiovascular limit  Normal* 0.05  0.02
Elasticity base cardiovascular disease to p.c. income  Normal* 0.000259  0.000096
Elasticity base respiratory disease to p.c. income  Normal* 0.000016  0.000005
* Knotted at zero. 
 
 
4.  The variance of variables in the long run 
The main question of this paper is whether or not the variance of the impact of climate 
change is finite. This is a tricky question. We do not observe the impacts. Most impacts 
will occur in the future. We do not have a systematic observation programme for current 
and past impacts. So, we have to rely on imperfect models. The second problem is that 
we have only a finite sample size, whether our observations are from reality or from 
models. Finite samples have finite variances. However, if the true variance is infinite, 
then the sample variance should grow with sample size. 
 
That is the test I use in this paper. FUND is used Monte Carlo analysis with a large 
sample size (1000 runs). The variance of crucial variables is plotted for small but 
growing subsamples. If the variance grows with sample size, we suspect the true variance 
to be infinite. If not, we accept that it is finite. 
 
Figure 1 shows the results for world average per capita income in the years 2050, 2100, 
2150 and 2200, for sample sizes ranging from 100 to 1000. The uncertainty is growing 
over time, but there are no clear upward trends. It would be surprising if there was an 
upward trend, because per capita income is bounded from below (at zero) while there are 
no positive feedback mechanisms in the model (and probably in reality) that would 
propel income to infinity. 
  
 
Figure 1. The standard deviation of the average world per capita income in the years 
2050, 2100, 2150 and 2200 as a function of the sample size of the Monte Carlo analysis. 
 
Figure 2 shows the standard deviations of the global mean temperature as a function of 
the sample size. The uncertainty is large and growing over time, but the uncertainty is 
remarkable independent of sample size. According to FUND, the uncertainty about the 























































Figure 2. The standard deviation of the global mean temperature in the years 2050, 2100, 
2150 and 2200 as a function of the sample size of the Monte Carlo analysis. 
 
Figure 3 shows the standard deviation of climate change impacts, normalised with GDP, 
as a function of sample size. For sample sizes up to 1000, there may be a small upward 
trend in the standard deviation. However, it appears that it just takes a lot of observations 
to estimate the standard deviation with some reliability. For sample sizes between 8000 































































































2200Figure 3. The standard deviation of the global monetized impact of climate change, as a 
percentage of world GDP, in the years 2050, 2100, 2150 and 2200 as a function of the 
sample size of the Monte Carlo analysis. 
 
The conclusion of this section is not surprising. Although the uncertainties in FUND are 
large, they are finite. That is because the model was constructed that way. 
 
5.  The variance of the net present marginal impact of climate change 
Figure 4 displays the uncertainty about the marginal costs of carbon dioxide emissions. 
Recall that the uncertainty about the total costs of climate change is finite. The 
uncertainty about the marginal costs is not, however. The standard deviation increases, 
with discrete jumps, with the sample size. This is not because of the uncertainty about the 
impact, which is finite, but because of the uncertainty about per capita income. The 
marginal costs are calculated by taking the difference between two almost identical 
scenarios. The uncertainty about the difference of two finite uncertainties is finite. 
 
The uncertainty about the marginal costs explodes because of the per capita growth rate. 
The uncertainty about per capita income is finite. If per capita income falls rapidly in a 
small number of scenarios, the uncertainty is still finite, because per capita income is 
bounded from below at zero. However, if income falls to zero, the discount factor goes to 
infinity, taking the marginal costs with it. 
 
This what happens in run 383 of the Monte Carlo analysis. Figure 5 displays, for that 
particular run, the per capita income in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. Figure 6 displays the per capita income growth rate, and the resulting discount 
factor. In this run, water gets so scarce in this region that the economy collapses. 
 
There is another factor at play. If a region￿s economy collapses, but not the world 
economy, that region￿s impacts would hardly count in the global aggregate impact, if that 
aggregate is calculated by summing the regional impacts dollar per dollar. I use a 
different aggregation method, however. Instead of adding dollars, I add the utility 
equivalent of dollars. In this specific form of equity weighting, regional impacts are first 
multiplied by the ratio of world and regional per capita income before they are added 
(Fankhauser et al., 1997, 1998). Figure 6 also displays the regional weight factor. This 











 Figure 4. The standard deviation of the marginal costs of carbon dioxide emissions, in 
dollars per tonne of carbon, for pure rates of time preference of 0, 1, and 3% as a function 












































3%Figure 5. Per capita income in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
in run 383 of the Monte Carlo analysis. 
 
Figure 6. The growth rate, discount factor, and weight factor in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union in run 383 of the Monte Carlo analysis. 
 
The above argument is about the uncertainty about the marginal costs of carbon dioxide 
emissions. An infinite variance is sufficient to render CBA inapplicable. However, not 
only the variance, but also the mean is infinite, for the same reasons. See Table 5. 
 



























































































Weight factorTable 5. The marginal costs of carbon dioxide emissions (in $/tC), for four time horizons 
(2050, 2100, 2150 and 2200), three rates of pure time preference (0, 1 and 3%) and two 
ways of aggregation (SS: simple sum and EW: equity-weighted). 
    0%   1%   3% 
  SS EW SS EW SS EW
2050  3.2 3.2  2.6 2.4 1.8 1.4
  (5.2) (1.5)  (4.0) (1.1) (2.5) (0.6)
2100  5.9 8.8  3.9 5.1 2.1 2.1
  (3.9) (5.8)  (3.0) (3.1) (2.2) (1.0)
2150  11.4 24.9 5.5  9.4 2.2 2.4
  (7.0) (96.3) (3.1) (24.2) (2.1) (2.2)
2200 25.0  ∞ 7.7  ∞ 2.3 ∞
 (57.9)  (∞) (9.1)  (∞) (2.1) (∞)
 
 
6.  Could the variance be infinite? 
Suppose that climate change is worse than expected. Suppose that the impacts of climate 
change are worse than expected. Suppose that vulnerability is larger than expected. 
Suppose that a lot of money needs to be spent on building sea walls and curing malaria. 
Suppose that agricultural yields are disappointing and storms and floods damage roads 
and houses. In a fragile economy, this means that economic growth is halted. It means 
that investment and past savings are diverted from enhancing productivity and preventing 
further havoc to restoring damage. It means that the economy grows more fragile. It 
means that climate change can do even more damage, making the economy yet more 
fragile. 
 
Can climate change cause a poverty trap? Recurring natural disasters can definitely 
contribute to poverty traps (Burton et al., 1993). Estimates of the impact of climate 
change suggest that they can be worth a couple of percent of GDP, particularly in poor 
regions. Climate change seems likely to cause poverty traps in some places, and with 
some non-negligible change at a regional scale. 
 
If economic growth becomes negative, then the discount rate becomes small. If economic 
growth is substantially negative, then the discount rate becomes negative as well. If the 
discount rate is negative, the discount factor begins to grow, placing relatively more 
weight on the bad years. If the discount factor grows large enough, the net present value 
may diverge. 
 
If globally aggregate impacts correct in some way for disparate per capita incomes across 
the globe, e.g. via the equity weighting proposed by Fankhauser et al. (1997, 1998), the 




7.  Discussion and conclusion This paper is concerned with the question whether the uncertainty about the net present 
value of the impact of climate change can be infinite. The analysis of Section 2 shows 
that the variance of the net present value becomes infinitely large if there is a set of 
parameters, with non-zero chance, under which the net present value becomes infinitely 
large. The numerical results in Section 5 show that this is the case in FUND. Section 3 
and 4 show that FUND is a standard model, not set up to yield extreme results. However, 
even in this model, there are circumstances in which climate change impacts become very 
large. Section 6 argues that such circumstances are not beyond imagination. The effects 
of very large, negative impacts on the net present value are amplified by the discount rate 
and perhaps by equity weighting. One cannot dismiss this result as the outcome of an 
extreme scenario in a maverick model. Per Section 2, what matters is whether there is a 
non-zero chance that the model and scenario reflect reality. 
 
The bottom line of all this is that it seems as if the uncertainty about climate change is too 
large to apply cost-benefit analysis. 
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Appendix. Assumptions in the climate change impact module. 
 
Table A1.  Impacts of climate change on agriculture (from Tol, 1999b). 
Region  rate of change 
(%GAP/0.04
0C) 





0C wrt 1990) 
OECD-A -0.021  (0.031)  0.398  (0.530)  2.29  (1.32) 
OECD-E -0.026  (0.025)  0.838  (0.450)  0.45  (0.50) 
OECD-P -0.016  (0.038)  0.321  (0.648)  2.71  (0.33) 
CEE&fSU -0.028  (0.027)  1.060  (0.452)  2.96  (0.43) 
ME -0.017  (0.011)  0.233 (0.193)  3.08 (0.49) 
LA -0.022  (0.015)  0.221 (0.280)  2.14  (0.26) 
S&SEA -0.022  (0.007) 0.253  (0.132) 2.16  (0.33) 
CPA -0.023  (0.023)  1.239  (0.403)  3.41  (1.01) 
AFR -0.012  (0.006)  0.189  (0.111)  3.00  (0.48) 
 
Table A2.  Impact of a 1° C warming on current day forestry, water, heating, and 
cooling, in million US dollar (from Tol, 1999b). 
Region Forestry  Water  heating  cooling 
OECD-A  218 (24)  -3  (3)  22 (22)  -11 (11) 
OECD-E  134 (16)  -2  (2)  13 (13)  -20 (20) 
OECD-P  93  (20)  -0 (0)  7 (7)  -1 (1) 
CEE&fSU  -136 (17)  -76 (76)  46 (46)  -19 (19) 
ME  0 (0)  -1 (1)  8 (8)  -1 (1) 
LA  -10 (2)  -1 (1)  3 (3)  -2 (2) 
S&SEA  140  (34)  -2 (2)  4 (4)  -4 (4) 
CPA  0 (0)  2 (2) 17  (17) -12  (12) 
AFR  0 (0)  -2 (2)  0 (0)  -5 (5) 
 
Table A3. Additional deaths due to vector-borne diseases for a 1”C global 
warming (from Tol, 1999b). Region Malaria  Schistosomiasis  dengue  fever 
OECD-A 0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0) 
OECD-E 0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0) 
OECD-P 0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0) 
CEE&fSU 0 (0)  0  (0) 0 (0) 
ME 155  (112)  -64  (13)  0  (0) 
LA 1,101  (797)  -114  (22)  0  (0) 
S&SEA 8,218  (5949)  -116  (3)  6,745  (1,171) 
CPA 0  (0)  -128  (25)  393  (68) 
AFR 56,527  (40,919)  -503  (99)  343  (60) 
 
 
Table A4.  Additional deaths (in thousands) due to cardiovascular and respiratory 
diseases for a 1° C global warming (from Tol, 1999b). 
Region  Cardiovascular ￿ cold  Cardiovascular ￿ heat  Respiratory 
OECD-A  -64.4 (4.4)  11.4 (5.9) 3.0  (9.7) 
OECD-E  -99.8 (2.6)  11.7 (4.0)  -2.8  (5.7) 
OECD-P  -13.1 (2.2) 3.5 (2.8) 1.0  (4.8) 
CEE&fSU  -87.5 (5.2)  10.7 (4.4) 4.5  (11.0) 
ME  -8.9 (1.3) 2.5 (0.4) 9.9  (2.6) 
LA  -20.0 (3.5) 8.1 (1.8)  11.1  (7.0) 
S&SEA -63.8 (16.9) 17.5  (2.9)  141.2  (34.1) 
CPA  -103.4 (21.7) 24.3  (4.6) 62.8  (44.4) 
AFR  -18.2 (3.0) 4.7 (0.5)  24.8  (6.0) 
 
 Table A5.  Impact of a one metre sea level rise (from Tol, 1999b). 
 level 
prot. 
Dryland loss  Dryland value  wetland loss  Wetland value  protection 
costs 
emigrants 











OECD-A  0.77 4.8  (2.4)  1.3  (0.6) 12.0 (8.6)  5.4  (2.7)  83  (74) 0.13 (0.07) 
OECD-E  0.86 0.7  (0.4)  13.1 (6.6) 4.0  (2.3)  4.3  (2.2) 136  (45) 0.22 (0.10) 
OECD-P  0.95 0.3  (0.4)  13.7 (6.7) 1.0  (1.1)  5.9  (2.9)  63  (38) 0.04 (0.02) 
CEE&fSU  0.93  1.2 (2.7)  0.9 (0.5)  0.0 (0.0) 2.9 (1.5) 53  (50)  0.03  (0.03) 
ME  0.30  0.6 (1.2)  0.5 (0.3)  0.0 (0.0) 1.3 (0.7)  5  (3)  0.05  (0.08) 
LA  0.86 7.8  (7.1)  0.3  (0.2) 50.2 (36.4) 0.9  (0.5) 147  (74) 0.71 (1.27) 
S&SEA  0.93 9.3  (9.6)  0.5  (0.3) 54.9 (48.0) 0.3  (0.2) 305  (158) 2.30 (1.40) 
CPA  0.93 8.4  (15.1)  0.3  (0.2) 15.6 (17.1) 0.2  (0.1) 171  (126) 2.39 (3.06) 
AFR  0.89 15.4 (18.4)  0.4  (0.2) 30.8 (14.8) 0.4  (0.2)  92  (35) 2.74 (2.85) 
 